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"LOCAL INCIDENTS" OF INTERSTATE BUSINESS
RIcHARD LLOYD STRECKER*
"Business Taxes" on firms away from home will be my subject'.
By "business taxes" I mean taxes other than property taxes as they affect
business organizations. In this area lie a vast number of species of the
genus business tax. Among these are gross receipts taxes, sales and use
taxes, and net income taxes. Technically different and sometimes different
in coverage, but essentially similar in substance to the foregoing are cor-
poraie franchise taxes and occupation taxes (corporate and individual)
measured by gross receipts (usually equal to sales) or by net income. An
unique bird in this menagerie is the fixed fee license tax.'
The phrase "local incidents" has a double meaning. A long series of
decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States has established the
concept as an important test or formula for ascertaining the meaning
of the Commerce Clause.3 This concept was part and parcel of the early
approach to state taxation that interstate commerce was absolutely immune
to taxation by the states. The idea developed under this phraseology was
that while interstate commerce itself could not be taxed, a state could,
consistently with the Commerce Clause, tax a local incident or activity
which was separate and distinct from the interstate commerce with which
it was associated.4
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
1Among the many recent articles on this subject are:
Barrett, Substance vs. Form in the Application of the Commerce Clause to
State Taxation, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 740 (1953).
Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An Appraisal and Sug-
gested Approach, 1953 Wash. U. L. Q. 233.
Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Commerce, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 138 (1956).
Marsh, Interstate Commerce State Taxation of Motor Carriers, 41 A.B.A.J.
603 (1955).
Sutherland, The Nation's Economy and State Frontiers, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 26
(1955).
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business under the Commerce
Clause, 5 Journ. of Taxation 303 (1956).
Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Com-
munication, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1943).
Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (1939).
Hartman, STATE TAxTiON OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953) is an excellent
general treatment.
2 Believing that fixed-fee license taxes present a substantial deterrent and
are perhaps inherently if not explicity discriminatory against interstate commerce,
the Court has consistently set them aside as applied to firms engaged in purely
interstate commerce. Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489 (1887) ; Best & Co.
v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940); Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946);
Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U. S. 389 (1952).
3 U. S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
See cases discussed infra under the topic, Distinguishable but not Separable.
4 As to the utility of the distinction consider the following observation by
Mr. Justice Rutledge:
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Where a business firm conducts activities outside the state of its
domicile,5 these activities often are rendered nontaxable by the application
of the Commerce Clause. But even if a given tax is, as applied, not violative
of the Commerce Clause, a further hurdle must be surmounted by the
state in order to exact a tax or impose a collection liability:-the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 In regard to property
taxes,7 there has grown up a rather well defined body of law which
operates under the name "jurisdiction to tax." In the field of tangible
property, jurisdiction to tax has been interpreted to require that only one
state may impose a property tax on a given item of property.8 As to
intangible property, the requirements of due process have been held to be
satisfied if a state (or more than one state) gives sufficient benefits and
protection to an item of property to justify imposing a charge therefor.9
There exist analogous requirements which must be fulfilled before either
a business tax or legal liability to collect a tax laid upon another may be
imposed."0 "Local incidents" of interstate commerce may satisfy these
jurisdictional requirements.
Dissenting in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co. and concurring in
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission," Mr. Justice Rutledge
eloquently called attention to the understandable tendency to confuse
If the only thing necessary to sustain a state tax . . . were to dis-
cover some local incident which might be regarded as separate and
distinct from . . . the commerce itself . . . all interstate commerce could
be subjected to state taxation ..... All interstate commerce takes place
within the confines of the states and necessarily involves "Incidents"
occurring within each state through which it passes. . . .And there is
no known limit to the human mind's capacity to carve out from what
is an entire or integral economic process particular phases or incidents,
label them as "separate and distinct" or "local" and thus achieve its
desired result.
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 423 (1946).
5 While the word "domicile" is used metaphorically when applied to corpora-
tions, the usual usage (perhaps unfortunately) connotes the state of incorporation.
Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 51 N. E. 531 (1898). The
unreality of the traditional approach led to the rise of the concept of "commercial
domicile" in regard to taxation of intangible property. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,
298 U. S. 193 (1936).
6 U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 What is said applies equally to death taxes. Infra, notes 8 and 9.
8 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905). The
principle was confirmed in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382 (1952). The
same rule applies to death taxes. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925),
followed in Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U. S. 251 (1949).
9 Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U. S. 486 (1947). As to death
taxes, the same is true. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939), State Tax Com-
mission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
10 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 321 (1945),
and cases discussed infra under topic, What Contacts are Sufficient to Satisfy Due
Process?
11322 U. S. 349 (1944).
[Vol. 18
"LOC.4L INCIDENTS"
Commerce Clause restrictions and due process limitations in cases where
their interplay is involved.
While legislation is valid only if both are satisfied, the Commerce
Clause frequently imposes a more rigid or strict test, and will invalidate
many taxes which might be valid from the standpoint of due process
alone. Since many cases can be disposed of under the Commerce Clause,
it should usually be considered first. If the tax is invalid under this clause,
due process questions need not be decided.
On the other hand, if a tax in its application to particular facts does
not violate the Commerce Clause, then the fact that the taxpayer is en-
gaged in purely interstate commerce is irrelevant in determining his
liability.
CAN THE PRIVILEGE OF CARRYING ON PURELY INTERSTATE BUSINEsS
BE TAXED?
Beginning with Robbins v. Shelby County,12 involving a fixed fee
license tax which was discriminatory against interstate commerce, the idea
grew that a state could not impose a tax "on" the privilege of doing a
purely interstate business. Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts13
applied this reasoning to invalidate a Massachusetts corporate franchise
tax measured by the par value of authorized stock. Cheney Brothers Co.
was a Connecticut silk manufacturing corporation which maintained in
Boston a selling office with one office salesman and four other salesmen
who traveled through New England. The salesmen solicited orders,
which were subject to acceptance or rejection by the home office in
Connecticut. The goods were shipped directly from the home office to the
purchasers. No stock of goods were kept in the Boston office but only
samples used in soliciting and taking orders. Copies of orders were re-
tained, but no bookkeeping was done at the Boston office and that office
made no collections.
The Court held that there was nothing in this that
... can be regarded as a local business as distinguished from
interstate commerce. The maintenance of the Boston office and
the display therein of a supply of samples are in furtherance of
,the company's interstate business and have no other purpose
* * **they are among the means by which that business is
carried on and share its immunity- from state taxation ....
We think the tax on this company was essentially a tax on
doing an interstate business, and therefore repugnant to the
commerce clause.14
A recent determination by the United States Supreme Court, de-
livered without opinion, 15 seems in effect to overrule Cheney Brothers
12120 U. S. 489 (1887).
la246 U. S. 147 (1918).
141d. at 153, 154.
15 Field Enterprises, Inc. v. State of Washington, 352 U. S. 806, 77 Sup. Ct.
55 (Oct. 8, 1956), affirming per curiam Field Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 47 Wash.
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Co. v. Massachusetts. Field Enterprises, Inc., is an Illinois corporation
engaged in the publication of two sets of books for children, Childcraft
and the World Book Encyclopaedia. The firm maintains division offices
throughout the United States, one of which was located in Seattle, Wash-
ington. The Seattle division office supervised activities in Alaska, Idaho,
Washington and Oregon.
The Seattle division office consisted of a suite used by the division
manager, by another supervisory employee, and by four employees who
did bookkeeping and stenographic work. The office contained a room
which would accommodate about thirty persons and which was used to
instruct salesmen. Sometimes sets of books were displayed in department
stores in the state, where a salesman would answer questions and take
orders. There were approximately 410 salesmen working under the
supervision of the Seattle division office. About 175 were residents of the
state of Washington, thirty of whom worked full time. Orders for ap-
proximately ten sets of books per year were taken directly at the Seattle
division office but only when a prospective customer happened to call at
that office.
All other sales took place as follows: By personal call, salesmen
solicited orders, which were taken on a form which read, "This non-
cancellable order is subject to acceptance in Chicago." The down pay-
ment or payment in full was collected at the time the order was signed.
The order and payment were delivered to the Seattle office. The order
was forwarded to the Chicago office which occasionally required a
credit investigation made by outside agencies and transmitted to Chicago
for analysis and decision.
All stocks of books except display and sample sets were maintained
outside the state of Washington. Shipment, pursuant to order and, con-
.tract, was made directly from the out-of-state stock to the customer,
F. 0. B. the point of shipment. All payments except the initial payment,
-were made by the purchaser directly to the Chicago office. All adjust-
ments and complaints were referred to the Chicago office.
Washington imposes a tax "for the act or privilege of engaging in busi-
ness activities." The tax is measured by gross sales or gross receipts. The
Supreme Court of Washington, relying solely upon a previous decision
of its own, upheld the tax. Per curiam, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington,1 6 explaining
merely by citing Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois."
While of course there are various factual differences between Field
Enterprises and Cheney Brothers, the only one which previous decisions
woul& lead one to expect to be material is the fact that the down payment
2d 852, 239 P. 2d 1010 (1955). Compare Michigan Corporation Commission v.
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 346 Mich. 50, 77 N. W. 2d 249 (1956), cert.
den., 352 U. S. 890, 77 Sup. Ct. 127 (Nov. 5, 1956).
16 Supra, note 15.
17'340 U. S. 534 (1951).
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and sometimes payment in full was made to the Field salesmen in the
taxing state. Speaking of this very point, the Supreme Court itself stated
its belief that authority to make collections would not prevent a similar
course of business from being "... wholly of an interstate commerce
character."'
8
Surely the volume and regularity of the business are material, for
example, in determining whether there are sufficient contacts with the
state to justify assertion of personal jurisdiction by a local court. 9 But
no amount of volume and regularity can turn a purely- interstate business
into a local one.
The Court's reliance on Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of
Illinoi 2 seems either to be misplaced or to indicate a radical extension
of the doctrine of that case. Illinois sought to impose its occupation tax,
2 1
measured by gross receipts, upon a Massachusetts manufacturing corpora-
tion which maintained a sales office and warehouse in Chicago. Some
goods were sold directly from a local stock to local Chicago customers.
These sales were clearly intrastate commerce in every sense of the word.
In other transactions, the local sales office figured as either the place where
the customer placed his order, or as a stopping off place for goods being
shipped from Massachusetts to a local Illinois customer. The Supreme
Court seemed clearly to assume that if it were not for the distinctly local
character of some of Norton Co.'s business, such as selling from a stock
of goods there in the state, the company would not have been subject
to the tax.
Where a corporation chooses to stay at home in all respects
except to send abroad advertising or drummers to solicit orders
which are sent directly to the home office for acceptance, filling,
and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious that the state of the
buyer has no local grip on the seller.22
The only issue raised by the company was as to the taxability of the
non-local sales. The holding was that the corporation has " . . . so
mingled taxable business with that which it contends is not taxable . . ."
that the decision below, ". . . attributing to the Chicago branch income
from all sales that utilized it either in receiving the orders or distributing
the goods was within the realm of permissible judgment." The Court
reasoned that services rendered by the Chicago office (which included
maintaining a local stock of goods, receiving orders, holding merchandise
shipped in carload lots in order to save freight, and supplying engineering
and technical advisers) may have been "decisive factors in establishing and
18 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 588 (1914).
19 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945)..
20 Supra, note 17.
2 1 The Illinois Occupation Tax, measured by gross receipts, was imposed
"upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at
retail in this State." I11. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 120, § 441, quoted in the opinion.
22 340 U. S. 534 at 537.
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holding (the Illinois) market." A foreign concern ". .. cannot channel
business through a local outlet to gain the advantage of a local business
and also hold the immunities of an interstate business." 2 3
Even this broad language, which occurred in the context of a case
in which some intrastate business was done, was not applied to those orders
which came directly from the Illinois customer to the Massachusetts home
office and which were shipped directly from Massachusetts to the customer
in Illinois. The case seemed to establish what might be called a "vortex
rule": Any intrastate sales activity may bring within the taxing power of
the state some transactions which would otherwise be immune. As thus
interpreted, the case has no application to Field Enterprises.
While Norton Co. is not cited by the Supreme Court of Washington
in Field Enterprses, it is clear that they had this case in mind as they
wrote the opinion. The following phrase, taken almost verbatim from
the Norton opinion, is applied to the facts of Field:
In the instant case, it cannot be denied that the services rendered
by the taxpayer's Seattle office are decisive factors in establishing
and holding the market in this state for its publications.2"
Obviously, it is conceivable that Norton Co. has now been extended to
apply to a case in which there 'are no local sales on the simple theory that
the maintenance of a sales office may be a "decisive factor in establishing
and holding the market." But the Court has always recognized since
the Robbins case2 that sending a solicitor in is essential for establishing
and holding a local market. Moreover, Cheney Brothers26 recognized
that a local office which is merely an adjunct to the company's interstate
business does not by itself change the character of a business from inter-
state to intrastate.
So far we have approached this question as though it involved the
following syllogism:
MAJOR PREMISE: Interstate commerce cannot be taxed.
MINOR PREMISE: This is interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION: This cannot be taxed.
As 'a definition of interstate commerce, I personally prefer Cheney
Brothers over either Norton Co. or Field Enterprises. It seems to me un-
sound to say, in the light of previous decisions, that Field Enterprises was
engaged in anything but interstate commerce of the old fashioned variety.
However, is it necessary to approach the question in this manner? Should
another approach be considered?
Back in 1938, in the case of Western Livestock v. Bureau of Inter-
nal Revenue, 7 Mr. Justice Stone enunciated as an "added reason" for
23Id. at 538, 539.
24289 P. 2d 1010, 1012 (1955).
2 5 Supra, note 12.
26 SuPra, note 13. As stated earlier in the text, this case may be in effect
overruled.
27303 U. S. 250 (1938).
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decision, the now famous "multiple burden" doctrine. In its full rigor and
carried to its logical conclusion, that doctrine seems to mean this: The
syllogism set out above is altogether too simple an approach to deal
adequately with the problems in this area. What is needed in state taxation
now is what was needed in state regulation at the time of the decision in
Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens. s What we neeed is an approach which
balances intelligently and realistically the competing claims of state and
nation. If followed logically, the multiple burden theory would have led
to the following general principle: A state may tax "interstate commerce."
What the Constitution forbids is a multiplication of tax burden on an
interstate activity resulting merely from the fact that the transaction
touches more than one state. An allocated gross receipts tax would appear
to be valid under this approach since no other state could tax the gross
receipts properly allocated to another. 9 Perhaps this describes Washing-
ton's tax as applied and upheld in Field Enterprises. We know from the
decision in Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen3 ° that Illinois could not
impose a tax on its domestic corporation Field Enterprises, Inc., with
respect to those Washington sales. A pattern seems to be forming: The
multiple burden test means that only one state may impose a gross receipts,
sales, or use tax with respect to merchandise sold in interstate commerce.
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. 1 establishes that the
one state which may tax interstate sales is the state of destination. A gross
receipts tax imposed by such a state has a kind of "built in" allocation.
Viewed in this light, and disregarding merely conceptual difficulties, Field
Enterprises may be in accord with the trend of decisions in the sales,
use, gross receipts tax area over the past nineteen years.
While it might be argued that Washington did not have sufficient
contacts to justify imposition of the tax, this contention is obviously not
true. Lesser contacts than this have been held to justify imposition upon
the out-of-state seller of the duty of collecting use tax. General Trading
Co. v. State Tax Commission.3 2
Several questions remain. Would a Washington court be able to
acquire personal jurisdiction over Field Enterprises, Inc., as to business
done in Washington by service of process upon one of its salesmen within
the jurisdiction of Washington? by service of notice by registered or
certified mail upon Field Enterprises at its office in Chicago? Could
Field Enterprises, Inc., be required to pay a Washington corporate
franchise tax or tax on the privilege of a foreign corporation to do busi-
ness in the state? Can Field Enterprises, Inc., be required to "qualify"
and secure a license before doing business in the state of Washington?
2853 U. S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
29 But see Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203
(1925).
30304 U. S. 307 (1938).
31309 U. S. 33 (1940).
32322 U. S. 335 (1944).
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All three of these questions are often thought to turn upon the ques-
tion, was the corporation "doing business" in Washington? Several
writers have suggested,3" and some courts have concurred in the idea, that
this simple phrase is entirely too elementary to handle the questions raised
under it. The three purposes for which the phrase "doing business" is
used (service of process, franchise tax, and qualification) are quite
diverse and facts which will satisfy one clearly will not satisfy another.
In fact, this has been the law for many years. As early as 1914, in the
case of International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,34 the Court held that
although the foreign corporation was quite literally engaged in a course
of business, which was ". . . entirely ,interstate in its character. . . .",5 it
was nevertheless subject to suit in the courts of the state by service of pro-
cess upon a salesman soliciting orders in the state. The regularity of the
solicitations and the fact that the agents were authorized to receive pay-
ments for goods were stressed as the Court concluded that ". . . the
Harvester Company was engaged in carrying on business in Ken-
tucky. .... 36
It is clear under International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington"7
that the course of business carried on by Field would subject it to suit
in Washington as to local causes of action by service upon one of the
salesmen. Service by registered mail alone was upheld in Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia ex rel. State Cororation Commission."8
Of the remaining questions, let us take the harder one first. Is Field
Enterprises, Inc., required to comply with the statutes governing qualifica-
tion of foreign corporations and required to secure a license before carry-
ing on business activities in Washington? If we ask whether it was
"doing business" in Washington, the fact that it is subject to suit there
would seem to answer this question affirmatively also. Nothing could be
further from the truth. Here the question is, in a very real sense, can the
state prohibit the doing of interstate commerce, and hence require the
securing of permission in advance? The Court has often denied the power
of a state to do this.3" While Feld Enterprises might be cited to the con-
trary, it is possible, as pointed out above, to interpret the case as involving
something quite different from a new definition of interstate commerce.
It therefore seems unlikely that this decision renders such a business
firm liable to qualification. However, the possibility exists that the case
would be interpreted to require qualification. The risks involved in doing
33 Stevens, CORPORATIONS, p. 999, note 1 (2d ed. 1949); Isaacs, An
Analysis of Doing Business, 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018 (1925).
34234 U. S. 579 (1914).
3 5 1d. at 589.
361d. at 585.
37 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
38339 U. S. 643 (1950).
39International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 (1910); York Manu-
facturing Co. v. Colley, 247 U. S. 21 (1918).
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business without qualification are sufficiently great, at least in some states,
to cause a thoughtful adviser to consider qualifying on facts such as these,
at least until Field's meaning has been clarified.
The remaining question is whether Field may be subjected to a
tax (similar to a franchise tax) imposed upon foreign corporations for the
privilege of doing business in a state. This seems to have been the essential
nature of the tax upheld in Field Enterprises. The only distinguishing
feature is that the Washington tax there involved was imposed upon
natural persons as well as corporations and was imposed upon residents
and non-residents alike. If the tax in Field Enterprises is valid, it is
difficult to imagine any corporation excise tax measured by gross receipts
which would not be valid under such circumstances.
However, many corporation excise taxes (in the nature of franchise
taxes) have measures that are entirely different from the Washington tax
which was measured by gross receipts. Thus, Ohio's excise tax on foreign
corporations for the privilege of doing business is measured by a fairly
allocable portion of the net worth of the corporation being taxed.4" Other
states use net income, and in some, par value of issued or outstanding
stock is the measure. Does Field Enterprises mean that all such taxes are
valid, whatever the measure? This is a difficult question and of course
cannot be answered without careful consideration of the economic effect
of each particular tax. It is even arguable that the Court is upholding the
Washington tax primarily on the ground that it is a valid fairly allocated
gross receipts tax. If this is the meaning of the case, it may have limited
effect on corporation franchise taxes having other measures.
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. OConnor" involved a Connecticut
tax on corporations "for the privilege of carrying on or doing business
within the state" measured by net income allocable to the state. It was
held that the tax could not validly be applied to a Missouri trucking
corporation whose only local activities consisted of maintaining depots
and pick-up trucks to assemble small shipments into full truckloads for
interstate shipment. It may be significant that of the original six majority
justices,4 2 only two are still on the Court, 3 while all three dissenters
remain. 4 Net income taxes have always been regarded as less burdensome
than gross receipts taxes.45 Unless Field is regarded as redefining inter-
40 Ohio Rev. Code §§5733.01, 5733.06, and 5733.05.
41340 U. S. 602 (1951).
4 2 Justices Burton, Vinson, Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Minton.
4 3 Justices Burton, and Frankfurter.
4 4 Justices Clark, Black, and Douglas.
45 United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918);
West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P. 2d 861 (1946); Aff'd.
per curiam, 328 U. S. 823 (1946). See dictum in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Beeler, 315 U. S. 649, 656 (1942), commented upon in Spector Motor Service, Inc.
v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602, 609, note 6, (1951). But see Roy Stone Transfer Corp.
v. Messner, 377 Pa. 234, 103 A. 2d 700 (1954), holding that the Pennsylvania net
income tax could not apply to a Virginia firm engaged solely in interstate trans-
portation through the state.
1957]
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state commerce (in which case qualification logically could be required)
the foundation of Spector appears to be shaken. Yet the connection with
physical interstate commerce was more direct and dramatic in Spector
than in Field, an important factual distinction.
1954 saw a reaffirmation of Spector as applied to a privilege tax
measured by gross receipts sought to be imposed upon an exclusively inter-
state express company. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia.45 But
despite appealing equities in the taxpayer's favor, the march of time
had reduced the majority from six to five,4 7 of whom only two are still
on the Court.4" On the other hand, the new Chief Justice Warren had
joined the three earlier dissenters;4 9 all four are presently sitting.
DISTINGUISHABLE BUT NOT SEPARABLE
The opinion in the case of Western Livestock v. Bureau of
Revenue5" is a subtle 'blend of the old and the new. Near the end, as an
"added reason" for upholding the tax, Mr. Justice Stone laid the foun-
dation for the multiple burden doctrine. At another place, the opinion
employs a more traditional approach, as where the Court says,
... the carrying on of a local business may be made the con-
dition of state taxation, if it is distinct from interstate com-
merce, and the business of preparing, printing and publishing
magazine advertising is peculiarly local and distinct from its




Thus was upheld a gross receipts tax as applied to advertising revenue
(not circulation revenue) received by a local publication some of whose
circulation was into other states.
In Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen5' the Court struck down
the Indiana gross receipts tax as applied to revenue derived from sales
made by a local manufacturing company into other states. Coming a few
months after Western* Livestock, and based solely upon the risk of
multiple taxation, Adams fed .hope that the new approach had totally
displaced the old.
The case of Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Calvert,5" decided
in 1954 provides an opportunity to study the interplay of old and new
in the recent thinking of the Court. The question there was the validity
of a Texas tax imposed upon the occupation of "gathering gas" and
measured by a percentage of the value of the gas. After the gas left the
well, it went through the refining plant of a petroleum company where
it was cleaned. Leaving the petroleum refinery in a pipe under 200 pounds
46347 U. S. 359 (1954).
4 7 Justices Jackson, Reed, Frankfurter, Burton, and Minton.4 8 Justices, Frankfurter, and Burton.
4 9 Justices Clark, Black, and Douglas. Supra, note 44.
50303 U. S. 250 (1938).
51Id. at 258.
52304 U. S. 307 (1938).
53 347 U. S. 157 (1954), Note, 23 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 347 (1954).
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pressure, the gas arrived on the premises of the taxpayer pipeline company.
The taxpayer compressed the gas, raising the pressure to 975 pounds and
sent the gas out in its pipeline to the destination: the Michigan and
Wisconsin gas distributing companies. As interpreted by the state court,
the tax was imposed on the occasion of "the taking or retaining of the gas
at the gasoline plant outlet... ."" As paraphrased by Mr. Justice Clark,
speaking for a unanimous court, the tax was not on the "taking" of the
gas but rather upon its "taking off" in interstate commerce.
55
This opinion is as ecumenical as Stone's original. All the para-
phernalia of absolute immunity are present. We are told that "... inter-
state commerce has begun. .. ."" And that far from being separable
local activities, the occasion on which this tax was imposed was ". . . a
part of interstate commerce itself." '57 Numerous cases upholding taxes on
mining, manufacturing, and producing goods for interstate commerce 
5
are distinguished on the ground that ". . . the tax here is not levied on the
capture or production of the gas, but rather on its taking into interstate
commerce after production, gathering, and processing."5 The approach
in this case is quite similar to the stream of commerce formula applied in
determining the validity of property taxes on goods moving in interstate
commerce.
6 0
The devotee of the multiple burden doctrine will find something
here for him as well as for his more orthodox brethren. After apparently
deciding the case, the Court adds what seems to be an afterthought:
Here it is perhaps sufficient that the privilege taxed, . . . is
not so separate and distinct from interstate transportation as to
support the tax. But additional objection is present if the tax be
upheld. It would "permit a multiple burden upon that com-
merce," Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., supra
(330 US at 429), for if Texas may impose this "first taking"
tax measured by the total volume of gas so taken, then Michigan
and the other recipient states have at least equal right to tax
the first taking or "unloading" from the pipeline of the same
gas when it arrives for distribution. Oklahoma might then seek
541d. at 164.
55M. at 167.
56 Supra, note 55.
57 347 U. S. 157, 168 (1954).
58 Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (mining); Hope
Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927) (producing natural gas); Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932) (generation of electricity).
Compare American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919) (manu-
facturing) .
59 347 U. S. 157, 169 (1954).
60 Empresa Sidercurgica, S. A. v. County of Merced, 337 U. S. 154 (1949);
Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886) (before journey begins, taxable); Champlain
Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U. S. 366 (1922) (during journey, safety stops do
not render taxable) ; Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933) ; Brown v. Houston,
114 U. S. 622 (1885) (after journey, taxable).
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to tax the first taking of the gas as it crossed into that State.
The net effect would be substantially to resurrect the customs
barriers which the Commerce Clause was designed to
eliminate. 6 '
WHAT CONTACTS ARE SUFFICIENT To SATISFY DUE PROCESS?
In McLeod v. J. B. Dilworth Co.,62 a traveling salesman whose
principal had no office in the state solicited orders for merchandise in the
state of Arkansas. The orders were accepted at the home office of the
seller in Tennessee from whence they were shipped in interstate com-
merce via common carrier at the buyer's risk. It was held that while
Arkansas might validly impose a tax upon the use of the property, since
that would take place within the state, a sales tax could not be exacted
by the state of destination since the sale did not take place there. In
circumstances essentially similar to these, a later decision confirmed
that the state of destination of goods sold in interstate commerce could
impose a use tax upon the buyer.6" As a practical matter, however, this
naked power is not a substantial source of revenue (except as to automo-
biles) 64 unless the tax is collected by the seller from the buyer and turned
over to the state. General Trading Company v. State Tax Commission65
decided that, under circumstances essentially similar to those existing in
the McLeod case, the state of destination could validly impose upon the
out-of-state seller the liability to collect the use tax. Here is presented not
a question of taxation at all, but a question of general legislative power
What contacts with the state of destination are sufficient to render the
out-of-state seller a legally responsible tax collector for the buyer's state?
An important recent decision has further clarified the law in this area.
66
Miller Brothers Co. was a Delaware corporation carrying on retail
selling directly to customers at its store in Wilmington, Delaware. Resi-
dents of nearby Maryland came to its store and made purchases. Some-
times the customers carried the merchandise home. Some of it was de-
livered to the customers in Maryland by common carrier, and in some
cases Miller Brothers' own truck made the deliveries into Maryland.
Maryland imposes a use tax and the liability of her residents for such tax
is not subject to doubt even though the goods were purchased in interstate
commerce.6 7 The Maryland use tax required "Every vendor engaging in
business in this State" to collect the use tax and remit it to the state. The
phrase "Engaged in business in this State" was defined to mean, among
61347 U. S. 157, 170 (1954).
62 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
63 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U. S. 335 (1944), and
cases there cited.
64 Ohio Rev. Code §4505.06 prohibits the issuance of an automobile certificate
of title unless Ohio sales or use tax has been (or is then) paid.
65 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
66 Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 (1954).
67 347 U. S. 340, 347 (1954), and case cited, sztpra note 62.
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other things, ... the... delivering in this State, . .. of tangible personal
property for use, . ..within this State." Miller Brothers having failed
to comply, Maryland seized one of Miller's delivery trucks while it was
in Maryland in order to enforce the asserted liability for tax on all goods
sold to Maryland residents, however delivered.
The Court observed that Maryland could not impose a sales tax
upon Miller Brothers,6" and based its decision partly upon the ground
that: "It would be a strange law that would make appellant more vulner-
able to liability for another's tax than to a tax on itself."69 The irony of
this observation lies in the fact that General Trading Company v. State
Tax Commission7 o had upheld the state of Iowa in making the out-of-
state vendor liable to collect use tax in circumstances essentially similar
to those in which McLeod v. Dilworth"9 had held the out-of- state vendor
exempt from sales tax. If "strange" means unfamiliar, then it is not a
strange law that would make a person more vulnerable to liability for
another's tax than to a tax on itself. It is the law with which we have been
familiar since the decision of General Trading Company v. State Tax
Commission as compared with McLeod v. Dilworth.
While calling attention to the fact that its author had dissented in
General Trading, the opinion of the Court leaves that decision standing
but circumscribed. It is pointed out that in General Trading, traveling
sales agents representing the out-of-state vendor conducted "continuous
local solicitation followed by delivery of ordered goods to the customer,
". ,,72 The reference to delivery to the customer strongly suggests that the
vendor made deliveries himself. An examination of the facts of General
Trading Company discloses that this was not the case. "The orders were
always subject to acceptance in Minnesota whence the goods were shipped
into Iowa by common carriers or the post."'73
The Court examined closely the facts of Miller Brothers' activities
with regard to the Maryland market. It appeared that approximately
$8,000 of Miller Brothers' $12,000 Maryland sales (about two thirds)
involved delivery to the customer in Maryland by Miller Brothers' own
truck. Advertising copy was sent routinely to purchasers whose names and
addresses were on the store's records, which of course included some
Maryland residents. While Miller Brothers 'advertised regularly in. three
Wilmington newspapers which undoubtedly had some circulation in
Maryland, and had made occasional use of radio broadcast facilities in
Wilmington which were heard in Maryland, the advertising never made
any special appeal to Maryland customers. The store did not except
6 8Id. at 345, 346, citing McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
69 347 U. S. 340, 346 (1954).
70322 U. S. 335 (1944).
71 Id. at 327.
72347 U. S. 340, 346 (1954).
73322 U. S. 335, 337 (194.4).
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telephone orders, and did not make use of coupons to encourage mail
order business in its newspaper advertising.
,. . there is a wide gulf between (the General Trading) type
of active and aggressive operation within a taxing state
and the occasional delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state
store with no solicitation other than the incidental effects
of general advertising. Here was no invasion or exploitation of
the consumer market in Maryland. . . These sales resulted
from purchasers traveling from Maryland to Delaware to
exploit its less tax-burdened selling market. That these in-
habitants incurred a liability for the use tax when they used...
the goods in Maryland, no one doubts. But the burden of
collecting or paying their tax cannot be shifted to a foreign
merchant in the absence of some jurisdictional 'basis not present
here.74
The opinion closes with the following remark which makes it clear
that only due process jurisdictional requirements are the basis of decision:
... we need not consider whether the statute imposses an unjustifiable
burden upon interstate commerce."7 5
In a real sense, the requirements of jurisdiction to tax are more
than just a group of technical rules regarding the relationship between
due process and taxation. They ought to be, and may become (despite
gloomy predictions to the contrary), merely special applications of the
general principles of conflict of laws as they apply between the states
under the Federal Constitution. The modern approach to jurisdiction
of courts, as exemplified by the opinion of the Court in International
Shoe Company v. State of Washington,"7 is to ask two questions:
1. Does the method of notification provide reasonable assurance
of actual notice?
2. Did the defendant, in regard to the particular transaction in
question, have sufficient contacts with the state to make it
reasonable to require him to defend this suit in this state?
As to the first question, the imposition of a tax often involves ele-
ments which are quasi-judicial; that is, the process of assessment or ad-
ministrative determination of liability is subject to procedural due process
limitations.7" These will not be discussed here.
74347 U. S. 340; 347 (1954).
75 Ibid.
7 6 After the decisions upholding taxation of intangible property by more than
one state, supra, note 9, the former sixty-four pages of cases on jurisdiction to tax
were deleted from the later edition of the leading casebook on conflict of laws. See
Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold, and Reese, Cases and Materials on Conflict of
Laws, (3d ed. 1951) pp. 662, 663. This action was taken before the 1952 re-
affirmation of the single tax principle as to tangible property in Standard Oil Co.
v. Peck, 342' U. S. 382 (1952). Notice also the 1949 decision in Treichler, supra,
note 8.
77 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
78 Strecker, Can a State Make a Nonresident Personally Liable for Taxes?
The Dewey Doctrine Dissected, 23 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 135, 161-164 (1954).
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The other branch of the inquiry posed in cases involving the juris-
diction of courts is directly opposite. Early cases on jurisdiction to tax
assume that in regard to property taxes, one state and only one state must
be selected as the situs of the property.7 9 Later cases suggest that the
essential requirement of due process lies in this: The state imposing the tax
must give sufficient benefits and protection to the property being taxed
to justify the exaction of a charge therefor8s Do the cases on jurisdiction
of courts suggest a still different approach? Should the question be,
not which is the state that may tax; not which states have conferred
sufficient protection and benefit to the property sought to be taxed; but
rather, has the putative taxpayer maintained sufficient contacts with this
state to make it not unreasonable that he should be required to contribute
to the support of government by paying or collecting?"'
This is the question that is asked in Miller Brothers Co. v. Mary-
land8 2 and may be the coming approach to answering problems of juris-
diction to impose a business tax.
79 Cases cited supra, note 8, and Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U. S. 204 (1930), Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930), First National
Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
80 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 364 (1939), State Tax Commission
of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942), Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport,
331 U. S. 486 (1947).
81 1 have elsewhere called attention to the distinction between jurisdiction
to impose a property tax and the power to create a personal liability against the
owner for the tax. Supra, note 78. It was observed that in the case of taxes which
do not bear a relationship to any specific piece of property, this distinction is
meaningless. 23 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 135, 171, 172 (1954). That is, jurisdiction to
impose a business tax necessarily involves power to create a personal liability
against the taxpayer. In International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S.
310, 321 (1945), the Court held that the contacts which rendered the company
subject to suit ". . . subject it alike to taxation by the state ..
82 347 U.S. 340, 344, 345 (1954):
. .. due process requires some definite link, some minimum con-
nection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks
to tax . ...
The question here is whether this vendor, by its acts or course of
dealing, has subjected itself to the taxing power of Maryland or whether
it has afforded that State a jurisdiction or power to create this collec-
tor's liability.
